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This study examines the relationship between the investment bank market share and the performance 
of the companies in Canada that sought their advice as an acquirer in a merger transaction. We 
investigate the validity of two alternative hypotheses proposed by Rau (2000): Superior deal 
hypothesis and Deal completion hypothesis. The former posits that managers seek top investment 
advisors because of their ability to recognise the added value in their investments where as the latter 
have their ability to complete the deal quicker. Tobin’s Q is used as a performance measure to find out 
if the top quality investment banks delivered greater value to their clients compared to low quality 
banks. We examine the effects of time on deal performance by measuring change in Q at two different 
points in time – one and two years after the merger respectively. Then we investigate the effect of past 
performance and past market share on the current market share of a particular investment bank. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The volume of worldwide mergers and acquisitions (M&As) continued to grow until the recent financial market 
crisis; thanks to globalization and industry consolidations. Canada had been particularly experiencing a booming M&A 
market evidenced by a significant growth in transactions related to metals, mineral and oil sectors. According to Amm and 
Willoughby (2006), during 2005 the dollar value of Canadian deals increased by nearly 85% over 2004 levels, while the 
growth of about 33% and 38% were recorded in the US and worldwide respectively. They further showed that in 2006, 
Canadian M&As had reached an aggregated value of US$93.5 billion, nearly triple the value of deals in 2005. Such a 
growth translates to demand for the M&A advisors, especially when dealing with very complex transactions. (Servaes and 
Zenner, 1996; Beitel  and Schiereck, 2003; KPMG, 2003). The growing demand for investment counseling has therefore 
created opportunities for investment banks worldwide. According to Walter et al. (2008), investment banks acted as 
advisers on deals worth $386 billion during 2003 in the U.S, with a total amount of advisory fees over $596 million. It is 
evident from these figures that investment banks derive a significant amount of income from their advisory services in 
M&A transactions. 
Chahine and Ismail (2007) have also shown that out of the $2.7 trillion generated during 2005 from M&As 
worldwide, roughly $31 billion was spent on financial advisors. This raises the issue as to whether the companies seeking 
such advice derive the value for such spending on M&A advisory services. Even though the question of whether such 
massive fees are justifiable may not have been resolved yet, a lot of studies have argued that these advisors continue to 
play a crucial role in the M&A activity. For example, Servaes and Zenner (1996) argued that advisers can reduce 
transaction costs particularly in complex deals. Others contended that advisers can improve the quality of the matches 
between acquirers and targets, accelerate the matching process and provide valuable anonymity in the preliminary stages 
before merger negotiations begin (see Diamond & Maskin, 1979; Grossman & Hart, 1980). However, after 
acknowledging the contributions of the investment banks in M&A deals, it is very important that we further investigate if 
their activity results in creating shareholder value. In theory, any project including M&A transactions should only be 
undertaken if it adds value to the firm. According to Bowers and Miller (1990) “managers should use the same decision 
criterion in choosing an investment banker as in all other corporate decisions by evaluating the impact on shareholder 
wealth” (p.34). When defining the notions of success and failure in the context of M&As, Bruner (2004) argued: 
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“Enhancing the welfare of shareholders is a fundamental objective of all firms-indeed, in the United 
States, corporate directors are required to implement policies consistent with shareholder welfare, usually 
synonymous with creating value” (p.31). 
 
Although there have been some press write-ups concerning the fact that mergers may not result in any value 
creation, recent studies have shown more positive results. For example, KPMG (2003) study indicated that over a third of 
the M&A deals in their survey which focused on deals completed between 2000 and 2001 enhanced shareholder value. 
Specifically, they showed that 52% of deals actually enhanced value when the measure was restricted to the post-
acquisition performance. Their findings also showed that only 16% of respondents had their own M&A teams primarily 
involved in assessing the value of the deal while majority of respondents sought the help of the board of directors and 
external advisers. This implies that in most M&A transactions, external advisors play a more influential role in assessing 
deal value.  
In their study examining the determinants of M&A success, KPMG (2007) results added some more evidence to 
the fact that M&As can no longer be viewed as unprofitable. According to their study, companies that employed 
investment banks’ advisory services in their merger were associated with an average of 3.7% and 10.8% normalized stock 
gain within 12 and 24 months respectively. Normalized returns being stock price returns relative to that of the other firms 
in the same industry. It is evident that such acquirers were constantly outperforming their industry peers. However, one 
could argue that such positive results can be attributed to the due diligence exercised by the advisors or to more 
professional management practices that put more emphasis on sound M&A strategies to increase the likelihood of success.  
Even though these recent studies tend to cast doubts on the added value of the advisory to the acquirer, the 
question of whether investment banks’ advisory services in such transactions are economically beneficial to the acquiring 
companies still remain open for discussion. As long as such questions are unanswered, the evaluation of M&A success 
and its drivers remain a fertile area for further research. To shed some light on these issues, this study examines the 
relationship between the investment bank market share and the performance of acquiring companies in Canada. 
 This study is motivated in part by Rau’s (2000) intriguing US-based findings that the bank’s market share is more 
closely associated with deal completion than wealth creation for the acquirer. These findings are at odds with the one 
factor that investors seem to be more concerned about - increase in their wealth. Given such results, one can conclude that 
investment banks’ main focus is on completing the deals in order to enhance their market share rather than generating 
value or preventing poor deals. Alternatively, it could be that managers simply fail to select the investment banks based on 
their ability to create value in mergers and acquisitions.  
According to Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004), wealth-seeking advisers are often faced with conflicting objectives 
when advising their clients. For example, on the one hand, they strive to complete as many deals as they can in a given 
period to boost their market share and income, on the other hand endeavour to create value for their clients. However, the 
fact that the banks seem to be concentrating more on deal completion rather than the client’s wealth maximization tends to 
create some conflicts. If indeed the bank’s market share does not reflect its ability to deliver high quality service, then the 
question arises as to why companies hire the investment banks, especially the top-tier banks (high quality banks) that are 
often expensive. We find it interesting to test the robustness of Rau’s findings in the Canadian context. It could be argued 
that perhaps the results are unique to the US M&A market. Even though, Canada and the US economies have always been 
interconnected by geography, their institutions and laws are different, thus enhancing the likelihood of obtaining different 
results. In addition to testing the validity of Rau’s findings our study is different from others in that we use Tobin’s q as a 
performance measure. The rationale for this measure is provided in later sections. These differences together with 
substantial non parametric testing undertaken in this study that are free of assumptions about statistical distributions 
contribute significantly to the existing literature. 
Subsequent sections are organized as follows: Section 2 provides literature review on relation between investment 
bank market share and performance of acquiring firm. This section is divided into three parts. The first part concentrates 
on the market share of an investment bank as proxy for its reputation and the second part focuses more on past 
performance as a better proxy for reputation and quality. The last part of this section provides research questions and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 discusses the methodology that we used to analyze the relation between the 
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investment bank market share and the performance of the acquiring companies. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
and the interpretation. Lastly, Section 5 provides the conclusions of this study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Currently, there are only a few studies specifically dealing with the relationship between investment bank market 
share and the performance of acquiring firms. However, their conclusions are inconsistent. Possible reasons for such 
differences in conclusions could be the use of different methodologies or differences in variables that have been 
considered by the authors when investigating the performance of M&A advisors. Moreover, the fact that there is no single 
objective metric that has been agreed by all market participants to judge the performance of advisors, makes the issue 
even more problematic. In investigating the performance of M&A advisers, prior research has predominately concentrated 
on the wealth gains that an adviser’s client obtains as a measure of the adviser’s performance (Chahine & Ismail, 2007). 
In general, previous literature has focused on two aspects: While earlier studies focused on the reputation of financial 
advisors using their market share as a metric, the recent research contends that past performance is a more appropriate 
measure of investment bank reputation in mergers and acquisitions. 
 
2.1 Investment Bank Market Share and Reputation 
 
Bowers and Miller (1990) examined the relation between the stock returns accruing to the acquirer and the choice 
of investment bank. They documented greater wealth gains for both the acquirers and the targets which hired more 
prestigious investment banks as advisors than those hiring less prestigious advisers. However, when the acquirer wealth 
was considered separately, the service of the top tier investment banks did not yield better gains than the lower quality 
banks. Michel et al. (1991) casts doubt upon Bowers and Miller’s conclusions. The results of their study showed that the 
degree of prestige of an investment bank had no direct relationship with the bank’s performance. The evidence was 
obtained when Drexel Burnham Lambert, a second tier investment bank outperformed all other banks included in the 
sample. McLaughlin (1992) showed that excess returns around announcement period were significantly lower for 
acquirers who had hired high quality advisers. His argument was based on the premise that most high quality advisers are 
hired for difficult transactions which require higher premiums with minimal benefits to the bidder. 
Rau (2000) investigated the determinants of the market of the investment banks acting as advisors and how the 
investment banks’ market share affected their client. His study showed that in both mergers and tender offers, there was a 
strong positive relation between market share of an investment bank in any one year and the percentage of deals it had 
completed in the past. He further showed evidence that the market share of investment banks were positively related to 
their ability to complete the deal. However, the study showed no relation between value generated in past advises and the 
bank’s subsequent market share. In support of Rau’s findings, Rau and Rodgers (2002) showed that acquirers advised by 
top tier advisers did not incur higher excess returns around announcement period. Such acquirers even earned lower long 
run returns than those generated by deals involving less prestigious advisers. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) also showed that 
the quality of the bank was more related to the probability of completing a deal as well as the speed at which such deals 
were completed. As in Rau (2000), they found that deals involving top-tier advisors rather yielded lower returns than 
other low quality banks.   
The findings that high quality advisers do not generate higher returns to their clients might be driven in part by the 
methodology used to rank the advisers. Rau (2000) and McLaughlin (1992) used a static ranking system to determine 
adviser quality and a bank’s ranking remained fixed over the entire sample period. This ranking procedure had been 
criticized in most recent studies (see Da Silva Rosa et al., 2004; Walter et al., 2008). They argued that such ranking tends 
to ignore the dynamics of the M&A adviser market that could be relevant in measuring adviser quality.  
Walter et al. (2008) tried to incorporate several variables in their study to overcome the limitations of previous 
studies. Firstly, they ranked advisers on their contemporaneous market share in a rolling window period of three years 
allowing adviser quality to vary over time. Secondly, they recognised that the level of complexity of a transaction can 
potentially influence the returns delivered by M&A advisers. Therefore, they considered various variables that control for 
the complexity and characteristics of the deals. Thirdly, they partitioned the sample based on purchase consideration – all 
stock, all cash and hybrid, and analyzed the abnormal returns to determine whether high quality advisers are able to 
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deliver greater returns to their clients across all categories. However, despite the inclusion and consideration of all these 
various elements in Walter’s study, the results from their abnormal returns model still showed that high quality advisers 
were unable to generate higher positive abnormal returns to their clients. In terms of the likelihood of deal completion, 
their results were a bit inconsistent with both Rau (2000) and Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) because they did not observe any 
evidence showing that high quality advisors were more likely to complete deals. However, with regard to the speed at 
which deals were completed, they also found that high quality advisors completed the deals faster than low quality 
advisers. 
 One interesting observation from their study that is worth investigating further was the result which showed that 
abnormal returns to acquirers in bids involving stock were more positive when high quality advisers were used. The 
results were surprising because such results could be expected in case of cash deals rather than stock deals. However, 
Walter’s results seemed to be consistent with Eckbo et al. (1990) who reported no significant abnormal returns for cash 
deals although deals with mixed considerations and stock alone showed that acquirers earned 5.7% and 2.7% abnormal 
returns respectively.  
While assessing the limitations of the previous studies on this subject, Kale et al. (2003), found that previous 
studies did not control for the reputation of the target’s advisor, thus obtaining negative returns. In their study they 
controlled for the target’s advisor and other confounding factors and found that employing prestigious financial advisors 
was advantageous. 
 
2.2 Past Performance and Reputation 
 
Although market share had been considered as a proxy for investment bank reputation, recent literature has 
criticized the use of market share as a measure of the bank’s reputation. Bao and Edmans (2006) have strongly argued in 
favour of past performance as an appropriate measure of investment bank reputation instead of market share. They 
reported that the top quality banks based on past performance criteria outperformed the lower quality banks by 0.92 
percentage points over a two year period. They further showed that such banks seemed to excel in terms of completion 
speed, completion probabilities as well as in wealth maximization. Their argument was that merger advisory mandates 
were being given on the basis of past market share league tables and that such mandates results in significant negative 
returns for the acquirers. They warned the investors against the use of past market share because it had proved to be a 
negative predictor of future performance. Specifically, they argued as follows: 
 
“A second normative strand of literature has found no criterion upon which clients can choose to 
improve future value. In particular, bank reputation measured by market share or prestige is not 
associated with superior performance” (p.1). 
 
They had shown that banks with perfect past completion records over the past two or three years were associated 
with higher cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 0.7%. Their findings provided an unusual view to literature by 
proving that reputation does improve future M&A performance, if measured on the basis of past performance, rather than 
market share or prestige. When investigating factors that motivate bidders to engage advisers in M&As in Australia, Da 
Silva Rosa et al. (2004) also argued that adviser league tables constructed on the basis of market share are unreliable 
guides to the roles played by advisers. They concluded that advisers generally specialize in certain deals, therefore even 
lower quality banks can excel high quality banks depending on the deal characteristics. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) argued that the quality of an investment bank should be determined largely by 
its past performance because the amount and the quality of the bank’s efforts are unobservable. In support of their view, 
CEO of Chessiecap, Inc,1 extended the argument showing that many clients have been unhappy over decades as a result of 
mistakenly choosing the promise of expertise over the evidence of experience.  
In contrast to the idea of judging quality based on past performance, Petmezas (2008) argued that more often the 
market fails to understand that past managerial performance is not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, at 
least in the case of acquisitions. His view is that, the performances of mergers often do not live up to investor’s initial 
optimism. For example, bull markets can present losing acquisitions for investors who are “infected by hubris” (p.4). 
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Usually in such instances stock price should reverse in the long run as beliefs are replaced by results. That is, with time 
investors tend to revise their views about the quality of the merger (losing their optimism), thus resulting in lower returns.  
Deviating a little bit from the perspective of reputation, Allen et al. (2004), focused on how financial advisors’ 
prior relation with clients affects wealth gains and deal outcomes. They found that acquirer’s abnormal returns were either 
negative or insignificantly different from zero. Similarly, Chang et al. (2008) examined the impact of prior bank-firm 
relationships, industry expertise and information leakage concerns on the acquirers’ and targets’ choice of financial 
advisers in mergers and acquisitions. They showed that the previous merger advisory relationships, bank’s industry 
expertise and bank market share increases the likelihood of a bank being chosen to advise a particular merger. They also 
found that if a bank had past relationships with both the acquirer and the target, it was more likely to stay with the 
acquirer. These findings were consistent with Francis et al. (2006), who showed that the likelihood of retaining an advisor 
was positively related to abnormal returns around previous acquisition announcements. 
The most recent literature continued bringing more interesting issues to the surface when evaluating the 
determinants of M&A success. Chen and Jian (2009) examined the effects of intangible assets on acquirer M&A returns. 
They argued that intangible assets of the company are the key determinants of a successful M&A integration that can 
strongly affect the overall returns, hence the need to incorporate a performance measure that takes the intangible assets 
into consideration when valuing M&As. They used Tobin`s Q in their study to show that sectors with a significantly 
higher proportion of intangible assets earn considerably higher M&A returns compared to other sectors. This study has 
really brought some interesting perspectives into the M&A literature that needs to be explored. Their results supported 
Lee and Tompkins (1999) assertions, that Tobin`s Q had been considered as an important and widely accepted measure of 
corporate performance in today`s financial literature. Extending the argument for the use of Tobin’s Q, Li et al. (2004) 
also argued that Q value can be used to measure corporate performance as well as to explain a wide variety of economic 
phenomenon, including business concentrations and corporate diversification. 
Chahine and Ismail (2007) have also contributed some insights to the current literature by showing how the 
acquirers were more likely to generate a large dollar gain when they pay higher advisory fees. Their study showed that 
most acquirers are not concerned so much about paying large advisory fees even though this may result in a higher 
premium. This implies that as long as investment bank’s efforts result in large merger synergies that in turn lead to higher 
acquirer dollar gains, acquiring companies find it rational to pay large advisory fees.  
Other studies have tried to examine this topic by assessing the position of the investment bank in M&A 
transactions. For example, Bodnaruk et al. (2008) found that in mergers in which the adviser to the bidder had a stake in 
the target, such deals resulted in lower post-merger profitability. The deals experienced a drop in return on equity (ROE) 
of 1.9% in the year following the deal. This was due to the fact that, target firms in which the advisory bank held a stake 
tended to be overvalued by more than 10% compared with targets in deals in which the advisor did not hold a stake at all. 
They concluded that advisory stake was positively related to the likelihood of deal completion but negatively related to 
the viability of the deal showing that such deals were not wealth – creating. The findings of these study suggested that 
advisors take advantage of their privileged position not only by acquiring positions in the targets but also by directly 
affecting the outcome of the deal in order to realize higher capital gains from their positions. Extending this argument, 
Stouraitis (2003), argued that investment banks that invest their money in the deals have strong incentives to negotiate 
favourable terms in order to safeguard their investment. His results showed that investment banks that advise acquirers 
negotiate favourable terms when they invest their own money in the deal, but lead their clients to overpay when they do 
not have financial incentives. 
Song and Wewe (2008) examined whether the expertise and independence of financial advisors affect deal 
outcomes and shareholders’ wealth. To our  knowledge, this was the first paper to examine the role of financial advisors 
from this perspective. After controlling for the endogenous choice of financial advisers by merging firms, they examined 
how investment banks’ expertise and independence affect deal premium, completion speed, success rate and 
announcement period returns. From the 202 boutique banks used in their sample, they found that on average, boutique 
advisors achieved a higher deal success rate. However, such boutique advisors were slow in completing deals probably 
due to insufficient technical resources. Despite the recent popularity for boutique firms, there is still no concrete evidence 
that merging firms benefit from deals advised by these specialized firms.  
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Despite all these issues that have been brought to light by recent studies, most companies still face a dilemma 
when selecting investment banks to provide financial advice on M&A transactions because usually such decisions are 
made on the basis of perceived quality of the adviser. This dilemma is partly driven by the findings of earlier research in 
the area of reputation, which showed that investments into brand building by a supplier are an effective measure in 
conveying the supplier’s quality to the market participants (Shapiro, 1983; Dunbar, 2000). Walter et al. (2008) argued that 
such a measure is subjective and stated that:  
 
“The quality of services provided by an adviser is not an attribute that is directly observable prior to the 
provision of the service. In economic terms, M&A advisory service can be described as an experience 
good, where the quality of the supplier’s service cannot be observed ex-ante. Due to this, high quality 
advisers need to be able to demonstrate their superior quality to participants in the market through some 
other means” (p.343). 
 
After going through all arguments advanced in literature, an important question may be raised. That is, if 
acquirers’ returns are not positive even after employing the top-tier investment banks (McLaughlin, 1992; Michel et al., 
1991; Rau, 2000), then why should companies bother about the services of investment banks in M&A transactions? Even 
the most recent study by Walter, et al. (2008), which attempted to include several variables that control for complexity 
and characteristics of the deals as well as considering the effect of consideration type, could not yield different results 
from the above mentioned studies. They found that even though high quality advisers may complete deals faster, their 
superiority is not reflected in increasing the likelihood of deal completion or delivering greater abnormal equity returns to 
their clients. Then what could be a possible reason for all these results? We believe more studies in different markets with 
different methodologies employed when investigating the determinants of the market share of investment banks acting as 
advisers in mergers and acquisitions needs to be carried out. To our knowledge, this study is the first one to examine the 
role of financial advisers in M&As in the Canadian context. This study contributes to the existing literature by updating 
the evidence through the use of the most recent sample of Canadian M&As and by checking the robustness of the results 
using an up-to-date methodology of measuring the improvement or decrease in post-merger operating performance. 
 
2.3 Research Questions and Hypothesis Development 
 
We build our hypotheses on the superior deal hypothesis and deal completion hypothesis proposed by Rau (2000). 
We investigate the determinants of investment bank market share by directly examining the explanatory power of these 
hypotheses. These hypotheses provide logical reasons to answer the following questions: 
1. Do high quality banks complete more value enhancing deals than value destroying deals? 
2. Do high quality banks complete more deals faster in a given period than other banks? 
3. Are the investment banks involved in M& A transactions niche players? 
 
Superior Deal Hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis tries to predict that acquirers advised by top tier investment banks should receive higher valuation 
on an average than acquirers advised by lower tier investment banks. According to this hypothesis, the performance of the 
acquirer in M&A deals is an important determinant of the bank’s market share. Specifically, it implies that top-tier 
investment banks will be less likely to complete value – destroying deals for their clients and more likely to complete 
value-enhancing deals than other lower quality banks. The prediction made here tends to be in line with the fundamental 
objective that matters to all shareholders-wealth creation. According to Schiereck et al. (2008), the superior deal 
hypothesis holds when there is a positive relationship between the average economic value of transactions, measured as 
the combined wealth gain and the reputation of the advisers involved.  
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Deal Completion Hypothesis 
 
The deal completion hypothesis on the other hand of the deal is of secondary states that the main objective of the 
investment banks is simply to complete the deal. The hypothesis further argues that as the incentives in M&A deals make 
the banks to focus on deal completion rather than value creation, no positive relationship between the acquirer’s excess 
value and the investment bank’s market share should be anticipated. According to this hypothesis, high quality advisers 
have more expertise and experience in M&A transactions, therefore are more likely to complete deals faster than low 
quality advisers. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
For the purpose of this study, we decided to analyse the merger deals that were completed during the period of 
2000 to 2008. The sample used was obtained from Mergerstat Database consisting of Canadian M&As announced and 
completed between 2000 and 2008. To maintain a minimum size in terms of value and control a cut off of $100 million in 
value and acquisition of at least 50% of the target were set. This gave us a total of 377 observations. However, we filtered 
the sample using the following additional criteria: 
 
1. The acquirer was a Canadian public company. 
2. The announcement date and the completion date were available in the database. 
3. The acquirer was a listed company whose financial data was publicly available in either Financial Post or Sedar 
database2.  
4. The name of the advisor for at least one of the parties was disclosed.  
After incorporating all these conditions only 128 deals were considered as a final sample. This forms the core 
sample for further analysis. However, when change variables are used the sample size will be reduced. Further, 
for some of the issues addressed not all the above conditions need to be met. In such instances tests with higher 
samples have been done where appropriate and such results are presented in Appendix I. 
 
3.2 Ranking Advisers  
 
Previous studies on M&A the advisors have commonly relied on the league tables when ranking advisors (Rau, 
2000; Michel et.al., 1991). Therefore, this study followed the same ranking scheme. For example, Rau (2000) grouped 
advisors into three different tiers according to their relative positions. He actually classified advisors on the basis of the 
number of times an advisor is ranked in the league table based on the value of transactions advised during each year. He 
referred to the top five banks every year as ‘bulk bracket’ or first-tier banks, the next fifteen as major bracket or second 
tier banks and the remainder as third tier banks. Rau’s methodology involved measuring the average market share of every 
bank as a fraction of the total value of transactions advised by all investment banks in any given year. Basically, each 
adviser in a deal is given credit for the deal irrespective of its role or contribution efforts. The fact that the ranking based 
on the league tables have consistently failed to capture the most crucial aspect of quality that matters most to shareholders 
– increase in their wealth, has made the credibility of these tables to be questionable. However, despite all these 
limitations, the use of league tables is wide spread. For example, most reputable analysts3 and academic researchers, even 
outside M&A field have relied on these tables for their various projects and studies.4 
Similar to Rau (2000), the advisors were grouped into tiers each year using a three-tier classification system. The 
first top five banks were considered as top tier (high quality advisers), those ranking from 6th to 10th ranked second tier 
and the remainder were ranked as third tier advisers (low quality advisers). Credit for any transaction was given to the 
acquirer’s bank only. Following Rau (2000) and Walter et al. (2008), in cases where more than one adviser was involved 
on the same side of the transaction, the tier of the highest ranked advisor in the group was taken as the tier of that group. 
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As in Rau (2000), the average market share of each investment bank was calculated as a fraction of the total value of 
transactions advised by investment bank in any single year. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses Testing 
 
We investigated the relationship between the investment bank market share and the performance of the acquiring 
firm by revisiting the two hypotheses:  
 
H1: Superior Deal Hypothesis 
 
The sample was partitioned by tiers to find out the deals in which the overall outcomes of the deal was wealth 
creation or wealth destruction. In this study, deals were classified as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on whether the change in 
Q value was above average or below average in the post-merger period. Thereafter, the proportions of good and bad deals 
completed by acquirers advised by the three categories of the investment banks were established. The incidence of good 
and bad performance was then tested for association with the category of advisers.  
As suggested by Hickl and Walz (2004), “when measuring the M&A success it is first of all necessary to think 
about the appropriate period of measurement” (p.7), we observed wealth creation one and two years after the deal 
completion to investigate effects of time on such deals. Even though, there is no common consensus yet on appropriate 
period, there have been some helpful surveys conducted to find out from managers as to what they thought would be an 
appropriate time to be given before success of a merger or acquisition could be properly measured. For example, 
American Management Association studied 109 US companies in 1989, responding to this particular issue of timing, and 
they showed that 34.9% were of a view that a significant measurement of success during the first two years after 
acquisition was possible while 65.1% argued that a valid measurement needed more than two years (see Hickl & Walz, 
2004). Obviously, it would be unfair to judge the performance of a merger or acquisition way before 50% of the 
acquisition program is implemented.  
A longer period was preferred because the process of adapting different corporate cultures and the interactive 
learning process are very time intensive. In this vein, we think of an M&A process as an organisational renewal strategy 
that calls for an evolution strategy that recognises that the old systems have to be unlearnt gradually to give way to new 
organisational strategy. Further, a very long period of time is not ideal for evaluation of M&A performance because over 
time other events are likely to have more influence on the company’s performance than the investment bank advice. 
Hence, we restricted our analysis to one and two years after the merger.  
We further examined the expectations of the superior deal hypothesis by investigating whether the market share of 
any category of investment bank is related to the post-acquisition performance of the acquirers. Specifically, our motive 
here was to find out if the three categories of banks are specializing in a certain kind of deal-cash, stock or combination 
deals- and thus have higher propensity to create value. We therefore partitioned the deals into three categories: Cash deals, 
stock deals and combinations. 
As mentioned earlier Tobin’s Q is finding increasing application in most organisational research (Lang & Stulz, 
1994; Chen and Jian, 2009). According to Li et al. (2004), Q can be defined as “the ratio of the market value of the 
outstanding financial claims on the firm on the current replacement cost of the firm’s assets” (p.51). Tobin’s Q ratio has 
been favoured for its simplicity in interpretation because its unity value provides a clear cut-off on performance. 
Companies with greater Q value in the post-acquisition period are able to create more value through efficient use of 
resources while those with a lesser Q value are associated with poor utilization of resources. To be consistent with the 
superior deal hypothesis, all top tier investment banks were supposed to yield a change in the value of Q that is greater 
than the change for lower quality banks. 
The theoretical Q measure of market value of securities/market value of assets is not easy to measure and 
researchers have discussed this issue and arrived at usable measures (e.g., Arcelus et al., 2005). We modified the 
measurement of Tobin’s Q used in Arcelus et al. (2005) to include other non-current liabilities in its measurement. 
Accordingly for the purpose of this study, Q is given by (1) below. 
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Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA (1) 
Where:  
MVE = Market value of firms common equity  
PS= Preferred stock 
DEBT= LTD + DEF+CL 
LTD= Long term debt plus other non-current liabilities 
DEF=Deferred tax 
CL=Current liability 
TA=Total assets 
 
H2: Deal Completion Hypothesis 
 
The deal completion hypothesis argues that the banks’ role in M&A is simply to complete the deals, in which case 
the market share of the bank will depend on the number of deals they completed in previous year. We tested for relation 
between the amount of time taken for deal completion and different categories of banks. The analysis was done 
controlling for the size and nature of deal and for the number of advisors involved in a given deal Da Silva et al. (2004) 
argued that multiple advisor deals relatively took longer time because more consultations had to be made hence the need 
to control for this variable. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
To address our research questions we need to identify using some criteria the top, middle and bottom tier of 
investment banks and measure their performance. The issue that arises is whether to define market share by the traditional 
value measure or by the number of deals which is being alluded to be a key performance measure for the investment 
banks. We have used both measures and tested whether the rankings under alternate measures are statistically different. 
The average ranks of the thirty firms under the two alternate criteria are given in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1: The Top 30 Investment Bank Ranking 
 
Investment Bank Average Ranking by Valuation of Deals 
Average Ranking by 
Number of Deals Tier by Valuation 
Merrill Lynch Co. Inc. 3.56 4.22 H 
RBC Dominion Inc. 4.33 3.44 H 
CIBC World Market Inc. 5.56 4.56 H 
TD Securities 7.89 6.33 H 
BMO Capital Markets 8.00 5.67 H 
Scotia Capital Inc. 9.22 6.22 M 
Goldman Sachs Co. 9.78 9.44 M 
Credit Suisse 10.67 8.89 M 
GMP Securities LP 11.00 9.56 M 
Citigroup Inc. 11.78 8.56 M 
Morgan Stanley 12.11 11.00 M 
Genuity Capital Markets 12.33 12.22 M 
JPMorgan Chase Co. Inc. 12.56 11.78 M 
UBS 12.67 10.33 M 
Bear Stearns Co. Inc. 14.22 13.33 M 
National Bank Financial Inc. 14.44 13.44 L 
FirstEnergy Corp. 15.00 12.00 L 
Raymond James & Associates 15.22 12.33 L 
Banc of America Securities LLC 15.22 14.56 L 
Lazard FrFres et Cie. 15.33 13.44 L 
Macquarie Bank Ltd. 15.56 14.11 L 
Keefe, Bruyette & Woods Inc. 15.78 15.67 L 
Compagnie FinanciFre. 15.89 15.78 L 
Orion Inc. 16.00 14.89 L 
Financo Inc 16.11 16.22 L 
Dundee Securities Corp. 16.22 15.44 L 
Rothschild Inc. 16.56 16.22 L 
WY Campbell Co. 16.56 16.89 L 
Schroder Salomon Smith Barney 16.56 15.89 L 
Peter Co. Ltd. 16.67 13.67 L 
 
Kendall’s tau is computed on the rank on two measures to test the level of concordance. The result is a tau of 
0.761, significant at the 5% level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of mutual independence between the two 
rankings. Since the figure of tau obtained is more towards +1, it shows that there is a high agreement between the 
rankings. The ranking can therefore be done using either the total values or number of deals. However, the market share in 
terms of valuation will be used as in previous literature because it better reflects the reputation of the investment bank. 
The banks are categorized into three tiers by this ranking, with the high tier consisting of the top 5, the next 10 as second 
tier and the remainder as third tier. 
Quality of the Deal 
To examine the quality of each acquisition, a proxy is needed and we have used the Tobin’s Q to measure the 
quality of the acquiring firm. If a deal contributed to the value of the company, then the post acquisition Tobin’s Q 
measure should be higher than the pre acquisition Tobin’s Q measure. The differences on both the Qs one year and two 
year later were calculated. Another measure that appears in literature is the excess market returns after acquisition. This 
measure was not used because of the market returns, which appears only in the immediate equity performance, where as 
Tobin’s Q measure is more indicative of the asset/liability structure of the company on which the acquisition has a more 
direct impact. 
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Variables 
To conduct the linear regressions pertaining to the research questions, additional dummy variables are created for 
various characteristics of the deal. These included: dummy variables for whether the deal was in cash, stock, or mixed; 
whether the acquisition was by generic acquisition, tender offer, or merger; and the role of the investment bank as an 
advisor or provider of fairness opinion. The continuous variables are also split into above average and below average 
categories when needed. The following are variables used in the analysis: 
Time Time from announcement to completion 
Size Base equity price of acquisition in millions of dollars 
Q0 Pre-acquisition Q 
Q1 1 year after acquisition Q 
Q2 2 years after acquisition Q 
dQ1 Q1 – Q0 
dQ2 Q2 – Q0 
Rank Average ranking by valuation as calculated in previous section 
Lagged_MS 1 year lagged market share of the bank in percent value 
 
Method Dummy Variables 
Cash 1 if the deal conducted in cash only, 0 otherwise 
Stock 1 if the deal conducted in stock only, 0 otherwise 
Mixed 1 if the deal conducted with both cash and stock, 0 otherwise 
 
Type Dummy Variables 
Merger 1 if the deal was a merger, 0 otherwise 
TO 1 if the deal was a tender offer, 0 otherwise 
Acq 1 if the deal was neither merger nor tender offer, 0 otherwise 
 
Role Dummy Variables 
Adv 1 if the role of the bank was advisor only, 0 otherwise 
FO 1 if the role of the bank was fairness opinion only, 0 otherwise 
Broker 1 if the role of the bank was broker only, 0 otherwise  
Adv_FO 1 if the role of the bank was adviser and fairness opinion, 0 otherwise 
 
Other Dummy Variables 
Multiple  1 if there were more than 1 bank involved, 0 otherwise. 
 
The following table shows the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (N = 128) 
 
Variable N valid Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
Time (days) 128.000 28.000 467.000 101.961 71.532 
Size ($million) 128.000 105.123 13548.610 1267.113 1977.521 
dQ1 128.000 -10.605 2.025 -0.503 1.784 
dQ2 92.000 -10.799 3.424 -0.532 2.075 
Rank 128.000 3.556 18.333 8.934 4.515 
Lagged_MS 106.000 0.000 0.220 0.069 0.073 
 
In this table we addressed the relationships between the quality of banks and the superior performance. 
Accordingly, we classified the above average and below average change in the Qs of acquirers across the three tiers of 
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investment banks that advised them and tested for association using chi-square. The table below gives the number of 
observations in each cell along with the computed value of chi square under the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 3: Chi Squared Test for Tier and dQ1 
 
 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Tier_H 20 48 68 
Tier_M 7 15 22 
Tier_L 15 23 38 
Total 42 86 128 
(χ2 = 1.131, p = 0.568) 
 
Table 4: Chi Squared Test for Tier and dQ2 
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Tier_H 24 25 49 
Tier_M 5 12 17 
Tier_L 13 13 26 
Total 42 50 92 
(χ2 = 2.224, p. = 0.329) 
 
From Tables 3 and 4 above, the preliminary results showed that the rank of the investment bank has no effect on 
quality of the deal, since the test statistics associated with both the one year and two year changes in Tobin’s Q measure 
are not significant at five or ten percent levels. 
To address the question of whether investment banks are niche players, we tested the null hypothesis that 
investment bank’s rank does not affect method, size or type of acquisition. This is done with Chi squared tests which 
separates rank by tier and cross tabulate it with the categories in question. The tables below show the results. 
 
Table 5: Chi Squared Test for Method and Tier  
 
 Tier_H Tier_M Tier_L Total 
Cash 27 6 15 48 
Mixed 20 4 6 30 
Stock 19 12 16 47 
Total 66 22 37 125 
(χ2 = 6.555, p = 0.161) 
 
Table 6: Chi Squared Test for Type and Tier  
 
 Tier_H Tier_M Tier_L Total 
Acq 44 12 29 85 
Merger 3 3 1 7 
TO 19 7 8 34 
Total 66 22 38 126 
(χ2 = 5.049, p. = 0.282) 
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Table 7: Chi Squared Test for Size and Tier  
 
 Tier_H Tier_M Tier_L Total 
Size_H 28 2 9 39 
Size_L 40 20 29 89 
Total 68 22 38 128 
(χ2 = 9.252, Sig. = 0.010) 
 
From tables above, we see that the method, type and size variables are significant at levels of 0.161, 0.282 and 
0.010 respectively. Therefore, at the 5% level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the method and type of the deal 
have no relationship with the rank of the bank. However, we do reject the null hypothesis for the rank versus deal size 
independence and conclude that the rank of the bank has an association with the size of the deal. An inspection of Table 7 
shows that the highest tier banks tend to complete larger deals. This is confirmed by conducting a correlation analysis on 
rank versus size which showed a Pearson correlation of -.225, and had a one-tailed significance of 0.002. Thus, rank is 
negatively correlated with size of deal. Since a top tier bank has a low rank value, this means that high tier banks are niche 
players in large valuation deals while low tier banks are niche players in low valuation deals.  
To address the question of what factors are associated with completion time, several null hypotheses were tested. 
This was done with Chi squared tests, separating the completion time into above and below average to see which of the 
five variables – method, type, size, multiple, and tier would show an association with completion time. Tables below show 
the results. 
 
Table 8: Chi Squared Test for Method and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Cash 14 34 48 
Mixed 13 17 30 
Stock 15 32 47 
Total 42 83 125 
(χ2 = 1.757, p. = 0.415) 
 
Table 9: Chi Squared Test for Type and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Acq 33 52 85 
Merger 1 6 7 
TO 9 25 34 
Total 43 83 126 
(χ2 = 2.946, p. = 0.229) 
 
Table 10: Chi Squared Test for Size and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Size_H 23 16 39 
Size_L 20 69 89 
Total 43 85 128 
(χ2 = 16.197, p. < 0.001) 
 
Since the p value obtained is less than 5%, we reject the null hypothesis that the size of the deal has no association 
with its completion time. Therefore, in the regression analysis explaining the completion time, the size of the deal will be 
considered. 
 
Table 11: Chi Squared Test for Multiple and Time  
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 Time_H Time_L Total 
Single 17 64 81 
Multiple 26 21 47 
Total 43 85 128 
(χ2 = 16.714, p. < 0.001) 
 
From the above table, we see that at 5% level, the completion time of a deal is associated with multiple advisors 
involved in a deal. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected in favour of the alternate hypothesis. This is consistent with 
the expectation the multiple advisors will increase the time for completion as coordination becomes difficult.   
 
Table 12: Chi Squared Test for Tier and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Tier_H 24 44 68 
Tier_M 3 19 22 
Tier_L 16 22 38 
Total 43 85 128 
(χ2 = 5.250, p. = 0.072) 
 
As shown from the tables (8, 9, 12), the significance values for time vs. method, type, and tier are 0.415, 0.229, 
0.072 respectively. Therefore, at the 5% level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the method and type of the deal 
have no relationship with the completion time. Even though the top tier banks showed a better completion time than the 
second tier banks, the third tier banks had the best relative completion time. However, none of these differences were 
significant at the 5% level. So we are not able to draw conclusions for rank versus time analysis. This needs to be revisited 
in the regression analysis. 
To address the question of whether lagged market share or rank of the advising bank affect the quality of the deal, 
regression analysis is needed. However, with the numerous categorical variables, we had to conduct inclusion tests so that 
we use dummy variables only for categories that showed some association. This was done with Chi squared tests 
separating the change in Tobin’s Q into above and below average for both the one and two years measures to see which of 
the categories – method, type and number of advisors, has as an association.  
 
Table 13: Chi Squared Test for Method and dQ1 
 
 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Cash 22 26 48 
Mixed 6 24 30 
Stock 11 36 47 
Total 39 86 125 
(χ2 = 7.872, p. = 0.020) 
 
Table 14: Chi Squared Test for Type and dQ1  
 
 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Acq 25 60 85 
Merger 0 7 7 
TO 15 19 34 
Total 40 86 126 
(χ2 = 5.871, p. = 0.053) 
 
 
 
Table 15: Chi Squared Test for Number of Advisors and dQ1  
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 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Single 27 54 81 
Multiple 15 32 47 
Total 42 86 128 
(χ2 = 0.027, p. = 0.869) 
 
As shown from the above tables (13 & 14), the payment method and the type of the deal have association with 
quality of the deal. Therefore, the dummies for cash, stock, merger and tender offer were considered in the regression 
analysis. We could not reject the null hypothesis that multiple advisors had no association with the quality of the deal. 
 
Table 16: Chi Squared Test for Method and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Cash 21 17 38 
Mixed 7 10 17 
Stock 11 23 34 
Total 39 50 89 
(χ2 = 3.886, p = 0.143) 
 
Table 17: Chi Squared Test for Type and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Acq 25 31 56 
Merger 2 5 7 
TO 13 14 27 
Total 40 50 90 
(χ2 = 0.865, p. = 0.649) 
 
Table 18: Chi Squared Test for Number of Advisors and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Single 28 31 59 
Multiple 14 19 33 
Total 42 50 92 
(χ2 = 0.216, p = 0.642) 
 
As shown from the tables (16 – 18), we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the method, type and the multiple 
advisors have no association with the quality of the deal based on long term performance. We observe that the 
consideration method and type of deal have significant relation with near term performance, but the effect is not 
significant with a year later performance. 
 
4.2 Regression Analysis 
 
To investigate further about the variables that explain the performance and completion time, we used linear 
regression analysis. More specifically, the following hypotheses are tested: 
 
Ha. The reputation of investment bank measured by the rank of investment bank or its past market share does not 
affect the quality of the deal in terms of value enhancement. 
 
Hb The rank of investment bank, does not affect the time spent on completing the deal. 
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In addition to the categorical control variables verified earlier, we need to check for the importance of two 
continuous variables, time and size. If these variables are significant in explaining the quality of a deal, they must be 
included as control variables. To see this, an inclusion test is conducted with the following regressions: 
 
dQ1 = α + β1 * Time + β2 * Size + ε (2) 
dQ2 = α + β1 * Time + β2 * Size + ε 
 
If the coefficients β1, β2 are found to be significantly different from zero at the 5% level for either dQ1 or dQ2, 
then the corresponding variables will be included. The results are shown in the following tables. 
 
Table 19: Linear Regression Inclusion test for dQ1  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.79755 0.28015 -2.84687 0.00516 
Size 0.00000 0.00008 0.00994 0.99209 
Time 0.00288 0.00228 1.26143 0.20950 
(N = 128, R2 = 0.012, F = 0.845, p. = 0.432) 
 
 
Table 20: Linear Regression Inclusion test for dQ2  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.94795 0.37783 -2.50890 0.01392 
Size 0.00002 0.00010 0.18502 0.85363 
Time 0.00385 0.00299 1.28594 0.20180 
(N = 92, R2 = 0.020, F = 0.912, p = 0.406) 
 
As seen from the tables, neither size nor time is significant at the 5% level for either dQ1 or dQ2. Thus, these 
continuous variables are not considered for regression analysis. 
 
Regression Analysis  
To test the superior deal hypothesis we ran linear regression. The dependent variable is the performance measure 
change in Tobin’s Q and the primary independent variable is the reputation of the bank measured by either the rank or 
market share. The control variables that are identified relevant earlier  are also added as independent variables using 
dummy variables for cash, stock, merger and tender offer. We estimated the following equations using OLS to see the 
effect of rank and lagged market share on change in Q after one and two years respectively: 
dQ1 = α + β1 * Rank + β2 * Cash + β3 * Stock + β4 * Merger + β5 * TO + ε 
dQ2 = α + β1 * Rank + β2 * Cash + β3 * Stock + β4 * Merger + β5 * TO + ε 
dQ1 = α + β1 * Lagged_MS + β2 * Cash + β3 * Stock + β4 * Merger + β5 * TO + ε 
dQ2 = α + β1 * Lagged_MS + β2 * Cash + β3 * Stock + β4 * Merger + β5 * TO + ε 
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The results of the regression as well as ANOVA analysis are presented in following tables: 
 
Table 21: OLS Regression with Rank on dQ1 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.262 0.461 -0.568 0.571 
Rank -0.007 0.037 -0.196 0.845 
Cash -0.206 0.427 -0.483 0.630 
Stock -0.041 0.475 -0.087 0.931 
Merger -0.339 0.751 -0.452 0.652 
TO -0.281 0.405 -0.693 0.490 
(N = 124, R2 = 0.010, F = 0.229, p. = 0.949) 
 
Table 22: OLS Regression with Rank on dQ2  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) 0.265 0.682 0.389 0.699 
Rank -0.026 0.049 -0.517 0.606 
Cash -0.690 0.626 -1.102 0.274 
Stock -0.434 0.715 -0.607 0.545 
Merger -0.246 0.910 -0.270 0.788 
TO -0.355 0.564 -0.629 0.531 
(N = 88, R2 = 0.026, F = 0.443, p = 0.817) 
 
Table 23: OLS Regression with Lagged_MS on dQ1  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.497 0.206 -2.411 0.018 
Lagged_MS -0.706 1.133 -0.623 0.535 
Cash 0.518 0.218 2.374 0.020 
Stock 0.229 0.229 1.003 0.319 
Merger -0.403 0.333 -1.210 0.229 
TO 0.115 0.206 0.560 0.577 
(N = 102, R2 = 0.091, F = 1.934, p. = 0.096) 
 
Table 24: OLS Regression with Lagged_MS on dQ2  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.026 0.323 -0.082 0.935 
Lagged_MS -0.415 1.267 -0.327 0.745 
Cash 0.028 0.318 0.089 0.929 
Stock -0.226 0.344 -0.656 0.514 
Merger -0.403 0.360 -1.122 0.266 
TO 0.014 0.264 0.052 0.959 
(N = 67, R2 = 0.065, F = 0.858, p = 0.514) 
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From Tables 21-24 we see that in the four regressions, neither Lagged_MS nor rank are significance at the 5% 
level since the p value were all greater than 0.05. The sign of the rank variable supported the superior deal hypothesis, but 
that is not the case with lagged market share. However the variables are not significant as indicated. Thus, we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the rank or market share of the bank has no effect on the quality of the deal at the 5% level.  
 
Regression Analysis: Completion Time Revisited 
 
Previously, we found that Size and presence of multiple advisors had a significant effect on Time, but could not 
draw conclusions about time for completion and the rank of advisor. The following regression investigates the relation.  
Time = α + β1 * Rank + β2 * Size + β3 * Multiple       (3) 
The results are presented in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: OLS Regression with Rank on Time  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) 87.048 14.652 5.941 0.000 
Rank 0.151 1.266 0.119 0.905 
Size 0.006 0.003 1.985 0.049 
Multiple 21.959 11.675 1.881 0.062 
(N = 169, R2 = 0.061, F = 3.616, Sig. = 0.014) 
 
We reject the null hypothesis that rank has an effect on completion time since the p value for rank is less than 
0.05. 
At this point the issue that remains would be to determine the factors that influence the managers’ decision for 
choosing the top tier investment bank given that they do not perform better than lower quality banks. A Linear regression 
is conducted where the dependent variable is the current market share for the years 2001 through 2008. The explanatory 
variables are the past performance of the bank (in terms of the average Tobin’s q measure change that its past clients have 
experienced) and the one year lagged market share of the bank. The coefficients of the variables are estimated; the results 
are shown in table below. 
 
Table 26: Linear Regression of Market Share on Lagged Market Share and Performance (N = 504) 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p Value 
(Intercept) 0.010784 0.004194 2.571 0.0109 
Lagged Market Share 0.438392 0.075002 5.845 2.03E-08 
Difference in Q after one year -0.007103 0.01007 -0.705 0.4814 
Difference in Q after two years 0.004453 0.006565 0.678 0.4984 
 
The results show that difference in Q for both time periods were not significant at the 5% level. However, the 
lagged market share is significant at the 5% level. Therefore, we have sufficient evidence that lagged market share affects 
the choice of the managers. These findings shows that managers tend to consider past market share instead of the 
performance of the advisers when hiring such advisers for M&A advisory services. One could argue that managers are not 
concerned much about maximizing shareholder value in these transactions, but rather go for advisors that have completed 
more deals because they trust that such advisers have a greater potential of completing a deal irrespective of whether a 
deal would be enhancing value or not. 
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5. Limitations and Conclusions 
 
In this study, we tested the superior deal hypothesis and deal completion hypothesis that are put forward as 
motivation for choosing the top tier investment banks. We used the change in Q after one and two years of merge as the 
performance variable and used average rank and the previous year market share as the variables to capture investment 
bank quality. The results showed no significant effect of rank or lagged market share on the quality of the deal or 
completion speed. In other words, the results gave no support to either of the two hypotheses. However, the results did 
support that investment banks are niche players in terms of size, but top ranked banks complete large deals while the low 
ranked banks complete smaller deals. With regard to the superior deal hypothesis, our results were consistent with both 
Rau (2000) and Walter et al. (2008), because they also showed that the top tier investment banks did not perform better 
than the lower tier banks. As for the deal completion hypothesis, our results differed from those obtained by these 
researchers. However, our results added some evidence to Da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) conclusions that M&A advisers are 
niche players. That is, they specialize depending on the characteristics of the deal. 
The results have to be reviewed in the context of following limitations: First, the data used in examining the 
market share of the investment bank and the performance of acquiring firm were limited because they only included deals 
that were completed. Therefore, the deal completion probability could not be tested since the data had no withdrawn deals 
that could be used. Most studies discussed in section two have shown that there is a positive relationship between the 
investment bank market share and the performance of acquiring companies. Those who argued in favor of top quality 
advisors believe that such banks have high probability of completing a deal because they have better expertise and 
resource than lower quality banks. Ability to complete a deal is also considered a crucial factor when considering M&A 
advisor. The other limitation was to the effect that a good number of Canadian M&As were excluded from the sample 
because they were not trading in Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). Only M&As which involved companies that had their 
financials available on Canadian publicly available databases such as Financial Post and Sedar were considered. Most of 
the deals which were excluded were advised by some of the American top tier investment banks or their subsidiaries 
which might have shown better results. The data used had majority of deals described as acquisition, while quiet a limited 
number of them were classified as mergers or tender offers. Therefore, lack of clear identification for most of the deals 
might have affected the results obtained in the study.  
The method used in measuring the performance of the acquirer also had its own inherent limitations. Since the Q 
measure was geared towards addressing the questions such as “are the shareholders better off after the deal than they were 
before”, Bruner (2004) considers such a measure as a weak form test of M&A profitability. He argued that the before and 
after comparison is a weak test because it fails to control for the other factors that might have triggered a price change, 
unrelated to the deal. In spite of all the limitations, this study provides additional evidence to Rau (2000) and Walter et al. 
(2008) studies in a market outside of USA. Similar studies across different countries will enhance the generalizability of 
the conclusions.  
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Appendix I 
 
(A larger sample of 220 deals was used to obtain the following results.) 
 
Table 27 
Chwe Squared Test for Method and Time 
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Cash 25 53 78 
Mixed 21 32 52 
Stock 27 57 84 
Total 73 141 214 
(χ2 = 1.203, p= 0.548) 
 
Table 28 
Chwe Squared Test for Type and Time 
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Acq 56 95 151 
Merger 4 12 16 
TO 15 36 51 
Total 74 143 218 
(χ2 = 1.672, p. = 0.434) 
 
Table 29 
Chwe Squared Test for Size and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Size_H 31 23 54 
Size_L 44 122 166 
Total 75 145 220 
(χ2 = 17.316, p. = 0.000) 
 
Table 30 
Chwe Squared Test for Multiple and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Single 38 113 54 
Multiple 36 32 166 
Total 74 145 219 
(χ2 = 16.168, p. = 0.000) 
 
Table 31 
Chwe Squared Test for Tier and Time  
 
 Time_H Time_L Total 
Tier_H 31 60 91 
Tier_M 23 22 28 
Tier_L 6 28 51 
Total 60 110 170 
(χ2 = 4.564, Sig. = 0.102) 
 
Calculations for dQ1 and DQ2 only include 156 deals for which the financial statements were available. 
 
Table 32 
Chwe Squared Test for Method and dQ1  
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 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Cash 27 31 58 
Mixed 7 29 36 
Stock 12 45 57 
Total 46 105 151 
(χ2 = 11.533, p. = 0.003) 
 
 
Table 33 
Chwe Squared Test for Type and dQ1  
 
 dQ1_H dQ1_L Total 
Acq 32 78 110 
Merger 0 7 7 
TO 17 21 38 
Total 49 106 155 
(χ2 = 6.587, p. = 0.037) 
 
Table 34 
Chwe Squared Test for Method and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Cash 24 20 58 
Mixed 10 12 36 
Stock 13 29 57 
Total 47 61 151 
(χ2 = 4.908, Sig. = 0.086) 
 
Table 35 
Chwe Squared Test for Type and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Acq 34 41 75 
Merger 2 5 7 
TO 15 15 30 
Total 51 61 112 
(χ2 = 1.055, p. = 0.590) 
 
Table 36 
Chwe Squared Test for Multiple and dQ2  
 
 dQ2_H dQ2_L Total 
Single 39 42 81 
Multiple 14 19 33 
Total 53 61 114 
(χ2 = 0.309, Sig. = 0.578) 
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Table 37 
Linear Regression Inclusion test for dQ1  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.61511 0.19940 -3.08476 0.00242 
Size 0.00001 0.00007 0.10893 0.91340 
Time 0.00126 0.00129 0.97377 0.33170 
(N = 156, R2 = 0.006, F = 0.500, Sig. = 0.608) 
 
Table 38 
Linear Regression Inclusion test for dQ2  
 
 Estimate Std. Error t p value 
(Intercept) -0.63554 0.26467 -2.40126 0.01800 
Size 0.00002 0.00009 0.18333 0.85487 
Time 0.00151 0.00161 0.93940 0.34956 
(N = 113, R2 = 0.008, F = 0.473, Sig. = 0.624) 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Chessiecap Inc, is a team of transaction professionals that leverages exceptional investment banking, strategy and 
technology expertise to drive premium value transactions. See www.chessiecap.com for more details. 
 
2 Sedar is a database of information filed with the securities commissions by Canadian public companies and investment 
funds from 1997 on. It includes company profiles, annual reports, press releases, financial statements and more. see  
http://sedar.com/search/search_form_pc_en.htm 
3 KPMG advisory division commonly use Thomson Financial database. ( see www.kpmg.ca for more details) 
 
4 Studies that have used Thomson Financial database in M&A include in Rau (2000), Walter et al.( 2008),Michel et al. 
(1991) and Dunbar (2000). 
 
